together for development. Jowitt was blunt in pointing out that he had written the grant proposal that funded the program and that the missions had sent on their best people with the assurance that these people would be returned to them. Some early, glowing, reports provide glimpses of the types of community improvement the program was designed to produce. John Marsh, the supervisor of the American Board's Chikore mission circuit, reported that "this venture is one of the most significant single steps in the progress of Native education in Rhodesia."8 Other supervisors agreed, providing specific examples to back this claim. Titus Mngadi, a London Missionary Society (or LMS) Jeanes Teacher working in the Hope Fountain district, had organized materials and supervised the construction of a dispensary to be run by the local Jeanes woman.9 Jeanes Teacher Zhakata, working in the Selukwe Reserve, ran monthly teachers' meetings with demonstration lessons and promoted the establishment of school gardens carefully fertilized by manure.10 Mac Sitole pushed teachers to institute "hand work" lessons in the schools and managed a circuit of schools without European oversight while his missionary supervisor went on furlough for three months.11 Jeanes teacher Ndebele worked to improve roads and establish vegetable gardens for each school. He also met with parents and headmen and, like his colleagues, gave demonstration lessons to teachers, providing academic and pedagogical suggestions of how to understand and teach the newly revised curriculum.12 For their missionary supervisors, Jeanes teachers' most impressive achievements were the large community meetings they called, at which they lectured on "the aims and objects of the school and the necessity of the children having proper equipment and being clean always." 13 Mission supervisors were impressed by Jeanes teachers' ability to involve the larger community with the school and the school with the larger community. Jeanes teachers sponsored parental involvement through parent committees and called for parents to show their support by providing manure for school gardens, helping with ploughing or roadbuilding, and buying school materials to equip their children properly. Jeanes teachers also called for students to bring the school values to the broader community by doing cleaning raids, where a group of students would go out and clean up a "kraal," sweeping away clutter, possibly building a latrine, and sometimes planting trees, flowers, or vegetables.14 Even the most muted supervisors' reports were positive, indicating the missionaries' hope that the Jeanes teachers would be effective in their awkward position as trained generalists working to bridge the gap between the more elderly and reactionary elements in African communities and the mission and Native Development Department agendas of progress. Missionaries sometimes decried the "indifference of parents" 15 or accepted a frustrated Jeanes teacher's conclusion that "his people are not going to change customs over night. He realizes that he is fighting the inertia prevalent among the native people-an unwillingness to do that which requires added effort, even though they are told that benefits may be derived."116 Missionaries, though, generally praised Jeanes teachers' energy, even when that energy produced such serious antagonisms that the teacher had to be transferred to another region.17 The missions expected a Jeanes teacher, after a broad training, to examine the specific area he found himself in, to work out his own goals, and do whatever was necessary to accomplish them. By the 1930s, some missionaries were disgusted with the slow pace of change in African communities. Missionaries were limited in numbers and racially conspicuous. They thus found themselves at least on occasion constrained by govemment involvement when they tried to push through measures ranging from compulsory attendance through unpaid community labor. Beating parents to force pupils to attend school was technically illegal. Forcing schoolchildren and their families to contribute unpaid labor to roadbuilding and gardening could not be insisted upon if the Native Department intervened. Jeanes teachers in pursuit of their goals, however, might be able to get away with such coercive acts without directly implicating missionaries.
And missionaries had compelling financial reasons for welcoming the Jeanes teachers and portraying them as successes. The program offered missions the opportunity of having the government pay salaries to teachers under mission patronage who would otherwise probably have left the mission in pursuit of wages commensurate with their qualifications. The missions were, by the 1930s, deeply concerned with the problem of attrition. Teachers' salaries, never high, actually dropped as the Jeanes teacher program grew. Missionaries expressed their desire to retain the best and brightest of their pupils. But they also acknowledged that these pupils could earn more as clerks, dip supervisors, foremen, or even independent 17 See the Report on Jeanes Teacher Work at All Saints Mission Wrenningham for half year ending June 1934, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1, which described an "excellent" Jeanes teacher in a region of "especially bad" schools, who "may have been possibly a bit hasty in some of his methods of presentation" and should therefore be relocated. builders. Sponsoring prize pupils into the program, however, offered the prospect of the administration paying for the missions to retain their top talent, the men and women missionaries expected to become leaders. 18
The program also offered the vision of another monetary benefit: with Jeanes teachers working to upgrade the outschools, the mission might to be able to expand further with less investment of increasingly scarce mission funds. Mission operations were expensive primarily because of the high cost of European skilled labor. A white male missionary supervising a school circuit (as required by the governent in return for capitation and supervision grants) could earn a salary of hundreds of pounds a year. And in addition to salary, he would expect a substantial house, a garden, plentiful domestic help, education allowances for his children, a pension plan, health insurance, paid transport, and a salaried furlough (sometimes a year long, going as far away as the United States.) Missions might be able to economize by substituting Africans for Europeans as school supervisors and development workers. And some missionaries even admitted that Africans, fluent in the local language, and understanding the situations, might actually be more effective than European community workers.
This vision of Jeanes teachers as Christian, African leaders-effective African leaders-expanding the influence of civilization and Christianity from the school to the community as a whole, was too promising for missionaries to drop, even in the face of practical difficulties. Missionaries from Southern Rhodesia did diverge from other regions' delegates to a regional Jeanes Teacher Conference and argue the need for supervision and an emphasis on practical rather than academic training for Jeanes teachers. But they encouraged as many as possible of the local men and women working as Jeanes teachers to attend, and give papers in English describing their work. Such teachers provided powerful images of Africans as experts, authorities, and professionals. And supervisors accepted the implications of this model of African leadership.19
Despite missionary and Native Development Department hopes, however, the Jeanes teacher program ran into difficulties. The program produced community workers who arrived in areas already affected, sometimes traumatically, by the changes of the previous thirty to forty years of European interventions. Experience with other government workers and mission activities produced some acute skepticism and resentment in the communities the Jeanes teacher were supposed to serve. Communities suspected that the program served not just African communities, but European power as well. Both European officials and indigenous chiefs and messengers explicitly linked the Jeanes Teacher program, like the agricultural demonstration initiatives, with Land Apportionment and the forced resettlement of large numbers of Africans onto distant, dry, overcrowded lands. Development programs allowed government officials to claim that they continued to take responsibility for the prosperity and progress of the African population even as they passed increasingly restrictive legislation on land, marketing, and cattle.20 More immediately, however, those who lived in the reserves observed a whole series of levies, ranging from dog taxes through dip fees, school taxes, and proposed taxes on men who were not employed outside the reserves. In theory, these monies were all earnarked for development.21 Those who paid, however, saw little immediate result, and were unable to control what forms of development the money went to.22 Senior men may also have resented being lectured at by young teachers, and by Jeanes teachers and demonstrators. Worse yet, some senior men clearly viewed Jeanes teachers and demonstrators as govemment agents, sent to sniff out the best land and make new expropriations possible. Paramount Nema of the Selukwe Reserve, for example, argued that the govemment was only trying to take land and that people needed more land rather than development lessons.23 Jeanes teachers were also perceived as new, higher-level, mission servants. And in areas with substantial tensions between senior men and mission youth, such as Gutu, this led directly to confrontations that damaged the teachers' credibility with elders and with Native Department officials.24
Jeanes teachers, therefore, could be troubling for financially stressed communities: they represented outside influences in the form of government and mission standards and rules, but they made demands on the local population in terms of labor, loyalty, and money. Rather than bringing money and resources into rural areas, Jeanes teachers called for self-help. They recruited children and parents to labor on schools, roads, gardens, and community layout.25 They created new political organizations in the school parent committees, which divided communities between those who sent children to school and those who did not. And they called for the use of new types of consumer goods that had to be paid for with money, ranging from the soap essential to their message of cleanliness to the slates and books required by schoolchildren, to the cloth and equipment that Jeanes women called for in lessons on sewing, knitting, and cooking.
Conflicts over Jeanes teachers made their way into archival sources when they involved more than the immediate community. Government-appointed headmen and "chiefs" could complain to their Native Department officials, and these officials responded. During 1934, two Jeanes teachers, Matthew Magorimbo and Lysias Mukahleyi, became sufficiently controversial that the entire program design had to be revised. During the recent past, particularly the last two years, the type of kraal school teacher has ... altered for the worse from the older responsible type of native with moral force and great personality to whom the heathen Natives could and did look up to with respect. In his stead appears a very young man who, although better educated, has obviously but little experience. He certainly commands but little respect from the elders but perhaps exerts some influence on the younger people, most particularly the girls. At any rate it can safely be said that his manners and actions are not conducive to that good feeling which appears to me so necessary to a thorough understanding between the Missionary and the older and more influential natives. Whilst admitting that the present system of examination is a necessary one, I would submit that educational qualification is not the main criterion and that the older fashioned grey headed native teacher was in real Christianity and in the uplift of the Native races more successful than his more modem and more scholastically educated brother.27 Faced with these tensions between senior men and younger, educated, Christian teachers, the Salvation Army backed its converts against the elders and government, increasingly acting in ways the native commissioner perceived as adversarial rather than working toward order and cooperative development.
Matthew Magorimbo
Under the pressures of the Depression and without increased government support for schools, the Army began to move away from the standard local schoolcentered mission toward a more international evangelical model. It applied to open schools that would provide only religious training, not even attempting the basic school code.28 It worked to stake out territory, even in the face of community opposition, to block the expansion of rival missions such as the Wesleyan Methodists.29 And it held revivals and night meetings to generate enthusiasm and converts, producing more than its share of parental complaints.30
Even more than some of the more conventional missions, the Salvation Army embraced the idea of the Jeanes teachers as a way for Africans to accept some of the burden of mission leadership, sparing white missionaries from school administration and teaching. Missionaries also saw these programs as ways of promoting development based on community, rather than mission, resources. Reflecting Salvation Arny concerns about territory, rather than school content and quality, Matthew Magorimbo began his Jeanes work not just with school lessons, but with public works projects.31 In 1933, he coordinated the construction of roads to schools in his area. In 1934, he called up work parties to "terrace" (reinforce) the new roads to prevent them from washing away in the rains.32 He also worked to establish school gardens for each of the schools under his supervision. In the Chiweshe reserve, an area that was becoming increasingly densely settled, he marked out school plots ranging from four acres for Kanokamwe School to 8.1 acres for Gunguwe School. These school plots, most of which were nearly five By the early 1930s, under government pressure, the DRC was beginning to hire a few better educated teachers, particularly from the American Board schools. But it only gradually yielded ground to the Native Department's attempts to restrict missionary power. Despite a substantial demand for better schools in areas dominated by the DRC, a government investigation into DRC finances and usurpation of state power, and the expulsion of one missionary as a bad influence, the DRC held on.
In the early 1930s, conditions in the district changed in response to a new government program: that of the agricultural demonstrators. These were men who, like the Jeanes teachers, studied at an advanced course at Domboshawa and were then sent into rural areas to work for community development. But there the similarities ended. The agricultural demonstrators were government employees, supervised by the government agriculturist for natives, E.D. Alvord, under the direct control of the native commissioners, and the program was funded locally, through the Native Reserves Trust fund rather than through external philanthropic organizations. Agricultural demonstrators were also supposed to be independent of the missions. In the Fort Victoria District, however, they were not. Initially met in the Zimutu Reserve with skepticism and hostility, the demonstrators chose to demonstrate on the lands of mission schools, rather than following the prescribed path of recruiting cooperators from among various people in the community, each of whom was to farm an acre according to the demonstrator's directions. Demonstrators' cooperation with the mission led to suspicion and conflict with the Native Department as the superintendent of natives of Victoria Circle (SoN Victoria) wrote to Alvord that it was "not good policy to allow the Demonstrator to get so involved with mission schools. This fact alone would account for his unpopularity with the kraal natives," and went on to assert that "No demonstrator will be a success without the active support and cooperation of the Native Commissioner."56
The agricultural demonstrators did not act as a pacifying influence in the Victoria region. The SoN Victoria not only complained about their connections to mnission schools, he also emphasized that they had poor manners, complaining that "I have often been particularly struck with the clownish ill-manners of those I have come across. I gather that they are often insolent to their elders and look down on those who have not been to school."57 Not only did some demonstrators antagonize elders and officials through "insolence" and mission involvement, they also irritated their sponsors by becoming politically involved. At least one of the first agricultural demonstrators in the Victoria circle was an active member of the Southern Rhodesia Bantu Association, a legal organization pushing the advancement of the rights of educated Africans.58 Local European settlers, furthermore, apparently deeply resented any programs that helped Africans raise and sell maize on the local market.59
Despite these inauspicious beginnings, agricultural demonstrators did rapidly build a following in the Zimutu Reserve. By 1932, the agriculturist was referring to demonstration work in the region as "very popular."60 Demonstrators acquired this popularity by helping local farmers expand their production and sale of maize and other cash crops. Evidently they did so by de-emphasizing the crop rotations and careful soil conservation provisions of their training and becoming, according to their critics, "farm managers for those who grow maize for sale."'61 Alvord, on the other hand, emphasized the usefulness of a substantial market for African maize in deviation from policy. Alvord argued that initially almost no one was willing to have plots, so demonstrators worked on mission plots to keep busy and that this was the only case in Rhodesia where the program became so heavily invoved with the schools. Alvord accepted that it was not good for agricultural demonstrators to become mission farm managers. After several years of successful demonstration activity, the Native Department began to use the demonstrators to coordinate the "centralization" of the Reserves. This meant that arable land would be distinguished from grazing land and land holdings would be fixed, rather than being subject to change as individuals came and went and practiced long-fallow agriculture. Centralization, however, also restricted the growth of the most successful market farmers of the region.
SoN Victoria to
Beginning his work as a Jeanes teacher, Lysias Mukahleyi found himself in the midst of controversies over who was in control of the DRC-dominated regions. Being paid by the government and working for the DRC in ways that were intended to serve the African community, Mukahleyi found himself in the midst of a triangular contradiction: the government and DRC mistrusted each other, and both mistrusted Africans, who returned the sentiment to varying degrees, sometimes choosing to pursue Zionist strategies or explicit political involvement, which irritated both government and mission. The Jeanes ideal of nonpolitical cooperative development in a Christian framework was probably never a real possibility in such a politically muddled region. Mukahleyi apparently did not even try to avoid politics.
Mukahleyi would prefer that he did not do so as he will only trade on the official connection to impose his wiil on the villagers.65 In this context, Howman objected to Mukahleyi not because of his involvement in some protonationalist politics, but because regardless of his specific politics, the Jeanes teacher's job was to push change. Mere membership in the SRNA would not necessarily have been a problem: Mukahleyi pointed out in his own defense that a number of messengers and interpretors in government offices were also members, and that the organization was for the benefit of all, rather than being inherently hostile to the Native Department.66 Howman repeatedly expressed a desire for control and the notion that the Native Department must back its own people, whether those people were NCs, chiefs and headmen, or merely agricultural demonstrators, rather than supporting the Jeanes teachers who were semiindependent and under mission supervision.67
The situation went from tense to directly confrontational when reports began floating into Howman's office from the Zimutu Reserve that Mukahleyi was trying "to arrogate powers." Initially these reports were vague. Howman reported an absence of complaints from agricultural demonstrators of interference in the centralization program and in fact stated that while he would like to ask for Mukahleyi's removal, "it will first be necessary to procure some direct evidence of wrong-doing."68 Howman's letter indicating his desire to get rid of Mukahleyi and his lack of evidence was dated 10 March 1934. The next letter in the file, however, with the same date, indicates that Howman had found some evidence, or at least a pretext, with which to accuse the Jeanes teacher. After speaking with the agricultural demonstrators Howman accused Mukahleyi of misleading the natives, disobeying a direct order which I gave him personally, and flouting the authority and orders of the Demonstrators who are directly responsible for the good order and wellbeing of agricuture in the reserve. I definitely instructed him not to interfere in any way with agricultural operations in the Reserve or give the natives the impression that he was carrying out orders received from me.69 Lysias Mukahleyi, according to Howman, had told people to violate the centralization land use plan by granting permission to plough in the land designated for grazing. Later, Howman went on to state that eight groups of men that he had seen had stated that Mukahleyi had given them permission to plough. Howman's acute hostility makes this case somewhat difficult to sort out. But there are several odd features of this file. First, unlike the files compiled on most complaints, especially with regard to mission malpractice, or teachers' malfeasance, there is a notable lack of affadavits sworn out by witnesses and an equally notable lack of specific names given as references. Howman implied that he was responding to local complaints but his early letters indicated a desire for any pretext on which to expell Mukahleyi. Once he had his pretext, Howman acted bluntly, with all the power his position gave him: he sent Mukahleyi, in the custody of a messenger, to go about in the communities where he had worked, and ordered the Jeanes teacher to publically proclaim himself "an untrustworthy person." Acknowledging that this would destroy Mukahleyi's ability to do his job, Howman went on to ask for his removal.71
Mukahleyi tried to defend himself and mobilize potential support not merely among the SRNA (which might have been counterproductive as it would emphasize his political connections) but from his mission supervisors and the Department of Native Development. He pointed out in the official record that the SRNA was a legitimate organization, with many government-employed members. And he flatly denied Howman's most serious charge, that he had "interfered in any way with the administration of the Reserve...."72 Howman made the charge of interference explicit by pointing to several violations: Mukahleyi, he said, had allotted land for trees and school gardens; persuaded children to weed his own garden; and "constantly organizes meetings" to discuss the work of headmen and the division of land by the headmen and chiefs.73
These charges, however, are notable for how easily they can be explained within the prescribed work routine of the Jeanes teacher. Jeanes teachers were supposed to encourage the planting of trees and school gardens. Persuading children to weed was also well within their duties, especially, as Mukahleyi's diary indicated, when the weeding was not on private land but on demonstration plots for community benefit. And calling meetings of parents and community members to discuss how the community could improve itself was essential to improving schools and providing the workforce necessary for larger community projects involving hygiene, roads, or anything else. Mukahleyi himself complained that Howman and others apparently misunderstood his attempts to create parents' groups for school improvement and community discussions of development. Mukahleyi described some of the meetings in his diary as being to encourage obedience to chiefs and headmen.74 Apparently some of the discussions at Mukahleyi's meetings got fairly heated. Mukahleyi himself, however, was The most serious issue, however, was not that of consultations, but of whether Africans, even educated and prepared as Jeanes teachers were, could be allowed to wield actual authority, or whether they must remain as supervised underlings. On this, the Native Development Department and the mission sought to portray Mukahleyi as an actor, an educated, responsible human being who should be granted some autonomy. But the CNC argued that Africans' autonomy was inherently suspect: the system under which the Jeanes Teachers work will always be fraught with the danger of their exceeding their legitimate functions, because experience has shown that Natives, when clothied with any sort of authority, nearly always abuse it, unless they are kept under the closest supervision, which is not possible in the case of a Jeanes Teacher.79 CNC Carbutt stated that he was willing to allow Mukahleyi to continue to work only under direct supervision at a mission station.
Yet may have been partially due to personal animosity between two rival strong-willed heads of department, Col. Carbutt and Harold Jowitt. But it was also institutional, sparked by the two departments' fundamentally different notions of how authority should be constructed in the African communities of Southern Rhodesia.
The Native Department cultivated and defended a concept of authority in which communities were headed by "traditional" elders, headmen and chiefs, who were, if suitable, granted official recognition by the Department and kept in line through a steady diet of ceremonial gestures ranging from salaries through native board meetings and official visits. On a daily basis, the native commissioner would coordinate the population by using his native messengers as go-betweens to deliver his directives to the "traditional leadership." The Native Department pushed legislation that made the native commissioner of the 1930s effectively supreme within his territory: the Native Affairs Act mandated that all Africans must obey his reasonable requests. Above the native commnissioner was the regional superintendent of natives, the chief native commissioner, and then the nonprofessionals: the governmental ministers and their staffs. Native commissioners appear to have seen this structuring of power and authority as effective and strong, but also somewhat brittle. They feared damage to any one of the system's key points, whether that be the prestige of the elders, the menace of the messengers, or the independent superiority of the nnative commissioner. The structure was not designed to bend and move. It had no place for ambitious young men who sought to gain power through their achievements or expertise as teachers, skilled craftsmen, prosperous farmers, or mission employees.
The Native Development Department, on the other hand, was built around a goal of change. It promoted a concept of development and progress rather than Native Department ideals of order, and sought to reconfigure notions of authority within communities from a static value determined by age and inherited position, to authority as a function of schooling, skill, way of life, and achievement. Order and good administration were not the highest values of the Native Development Department. Instead, the Department valued its own concepts of progress and improved quality of life.
Participation and Development
The program's problems, however, were not merely at the level of interdepartmental bureaucratic competition: they involved the very notion of authority in rural Zimbabwe. In its ideal form, the Jeanes teacher program was supposed to be highly voluntary as parents and community members observed, decided what they wanted, and then developed their community's resources and institutions. This model of consensus-based voluntary development, however, did not fit the realities of reserve communities. Within the increasingly controlled and segregated context of Southern Rhodesia, authority and economic well-being in the reserves did not come from popular cooperation and consensus but through preferential access to outside patrons and connections. The idyllic assumption that rural communities would automatically work together to promote better lives was quite simply fantastic within a context where individuals and families increasingly competed for land, access to markets, jobs, building contracts, labor, and government positions.
Jeanes teachers, and indeed the other demonstration programs as well, were based on the idea that rural communities merely needed to see what was possible and they would voluntarily sacrifice and work to achieve better lives and conditions. But the principal demonstration that younger, educated men observed was that of Europeans' accumulation of goods and ostentatious display of status.
When the idea of teaching by demonstration and voluntary emulation failed, therefore, the Jeanes teachers and demonstrators followed the model of authority that dominated the region's culture, society, and economy: they claimed authority based on position and connections, and gave orders, regardless of whether they actually had the legal authority to do so. Though the program had been initiated as a cooperative, voluntary, development initiative, it rapidly became an early exercise in what Leslie Bessant calls "coercive development," relying on orders and force rather than education and collective interests.83
Community development programs in Southern Rhodesia suffered because they were based on an ideal of community that failed to fit the realities of Rhodesia. Community efforts to mobilize, efforts that involved both senior men and younger men and women, had been repeatedly blocked by mission and government efforts to reinterpret demands and actions. When senior men called for better schools and offered to pay for them-as Ziki and his people on the Devuli Ranch, who worked for American Board schools-government underfunding and the depression of the economy through maize control, destocking, and restrictions on cattle sales thwarted their aims. When younger and older men mobilized through the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union to petition for useful education in the Umchingwe block of Insiza District, government reinterpretations of their wants led to the imposition of a project that failed to meet their goals.84
The Jeanes teacher initiative was designed to encourage communities to develop suitable goals and then provide them with nonpolitical, nonthreatening ways of pursuing these goals. In a politicized environmemnt, however, where goals could only be achieved by demanding more or taking from one group to give to another, the Jeanes teachers' close ties to the administration and missions hampered their ability to build coalitions with local parents and community leaders. And teachers' mobilization of communities to discuss political problems created suspiscion in administrative officials, ranging from the chief native commissioner to the staff of messengers who coordinated the information flow into local native commissioners' offices. Caught between the various interests they were intended to serve, Jeanes teachers resorted to orders and force to produce results, increasing antagonisms in the process, antagonisms that further broke apart the communities they were supposed to coordinate and build.
The most successful Jeanes teachers proved to be among the least ambitious. The female Jeanes teachers who provided classes, one-on-one medical help, voluntary information, and hygiene advice proved little threat and provoked little controversy. The male Jeanes teachers who focused on the mission schools and functioned strictly as teacher supervisors, rather than large-scale development workers, survived to be promoted into African superintendents when the Jeanes teacher program was phased out in favor of more specialized education and development workers. This sharply delimited pattern of success, however, raised questions about the program's central logic. The Native Development Departnent and the missions failed to develop and sustain a program capable of allowing cooperative, voluntary rural development to produce changes in the power structure and ways of life of rural Africans. Rather than bringing Africans together or taking advantage of any common interests they might have, development programs such as the Jeanes teacher program split them into groups battling with each other for control of time, labor, resources, and authority. Ultimately, the programs promoted faction and dispute about obligations and the distribution of existing resources, rather than providing mechanisms through which communities could bootstrap themselves to comfort and affluence. And even the program's controversies revolved around the question of power and who had the authority to give orders, rather than around any question of what would benefit the most people or create new communal institutions for development.
